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BEYOND THE FCN TREATY: JAPANESE
MULTINATIONALS UNDER TITLE VII
INTRODUCTION
As rapid communication and transportation have come of age,
multinational enterprises have become increasingly commonplace.
Corporations are expanding beyond their national borders and estab-
lishing subsidiaries in other parts of the world.1 By providing employ-
ment opportunities to citizens of the host country, most corporations
have adapted well to international expansion and have assimilated
easily. 2 Japanese multinationals, on the other hand, have exported
their unusual management techniques when establishing a foreign
subsidiary and have staffed their international operations primarily
with executives who are citizens of Japan. 3 These Japanese companies
believe that it would be impracticable for them to use managers who
are citizens of the host nation in their overseas subsidiaries because the
successful, yet highly unusual, Japanese management style requires
employees who are intimately familiar with Japanese business prac-
tices. 4
This policy of favoring Japanese citizens for executive or managerial
positions has often caused conflict because of alleged discrimination
on grounds of national origin. The issue was recently raised in Avag-
liano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. , in which American employ-
1. See D. Heenan & H. Perlmutter, Multinational Organization Development 3
(1979); International Labour Office, Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy 4-
16 (1973); V. Salera, Multinational Business 5 (1969); Aharoni, On the Definition of
a Multinational Corporation, in The Multinational Enterprise in Transition 3 (1972).
2. See A. Dickerman, Training Japanese Managers 96 (1974); T. Gladwin & I.
Walter, Multinationals Under Fire 408 (1980); Y. Tsurumi, The Japanese Are Com-
ing 261 (1976).
3. A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 96; T. Gladwin & I. Walter, supra note 2, at
408; Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 260-62; M. Yoshino, Japan's Multinational Enter-
prises 167-68 (1976); Sethi & Swanson, Are Foreign Multinationals Violating U.S.
Civil Rights Laws?, 4 Employee Rel. L.J. 485, 502 (1979).
4. Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 262 (The unusual methods of inter- and intra-
organizational communication require that only" 'their own people' be placed in key
posts within the overseas subsidiaries."); M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168 (A man-
ager of a Japanese-owned subsidiary "would find it impossible to manage an organi-
zation without the support of subordinates who share the same work style.");
Stevens, Applicability of U.S. Employment Discrimination Laws to Foreign Corpo-
rations in the United States, 1 U.C.L.A. Pac. Basin L.J. 153, 160 (1982) ("[K]nowl-
edge of Japanese language and business practice[s] could be justified as being neces-
sary to the successful operation of the company's business."); see Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 n.19 (1982) ("There can be little doubt
that some positions in a Japanese controlled company doing business in the United
States call for great familiarity with not only the language of Japan, but also the
culture, customs, and business practices of that country.").
5. 473 F. Supp. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).
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ees of a United States-based subsidiary of a Japanese corporation
alleged in district court that they were injured as a result of this
discrimination.6 The plaintiffs argued that the policy of treating Japa-
nese citizens more favorably than their American co-workers violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 7
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer to "refuse to hire or ... otherwise to discriminate against any
individual ...because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin .. . . .. The Japanese subsidiary maintained that it
was immune from Title VII because of Article VIII of the 1953
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN Treaty) be-
tween the United States and Japan. 10 The Treaty provides that "[n]a-
tionals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to en-
gage ... executive personnel ...of their choice."" The defendant
in Avagliano asserted that this particular clause placed its actions
beyond the reach of Title VII.12 The Supreme Court held, however,
6. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).
Plaintiffs had also charged their employer with sex discrimination and with violating
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The district court dismissed the § 1981 claim, finding that
plaintiffs' allegations were "insufficient to sustain a cause of action under section
1981." 473 F. Supp. at 514.
7. 473 F. Supp. at 508.
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
9. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).
10. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
11. Id., art. VIII, 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
12. 473 F. Supp. at 508 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976)). The
district court found that because Sumitomo was incorporated in the United States, it
was not a Japanese company, and therefore could not invoke Article VIII(l) of the
FCN Treaty. 473 F. Supp. at 512-13. The court certified for interlocutory appeal to
the court of appeals. 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981). The circuit court held that locally
incorporated subsidiaries of a foreign company are covered by the FCN Treaty. 638
F.2d at 557-58. The court further found that the "of their choice" language of the
treaty did not immunize Sumitomo from complying with Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 558. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether
Article VIII(1) of the FCN Treaty can be invoked by a U.S.-based subsidiary of a
Japanese corporation. 102 S. Ct. 2374, 2376 (1982). The Court held that Sumitomo is
not a Japanese company, and therefore is not covered by the specific provision of the
FCN Treaty. Id. at 2382.
Virtually the same issue was presented in Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F.
Supp. 1 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981),
vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982). The Supreme Court remanded the case for further
consideration in light of Avagliano. 102 S. Ct. 2951; see Linskey v. Heidelberg E.,
Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1686 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (even if Treaty applies
to an American-based subsidiary of a Danish parent company, it does not override
Title VII); Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,903 (N.D.
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that because the subsidiary was incorporated under the laws of New
York, it was a company of the United States13 and thus could not
invoke the rights provided by the FCN Treaty exemption.14 The Court
specifically reserved judgment on whether the Japanese practice of
staffing their international operations with citizens of Japan is viola-
tive of Title VII. 15
Discriminatory hiring practices such as those of the Japanese
multinationals will not automatically constitute a violation of Title
VII, for once an employment policy is found to be discriminatory, one
of two defenses may be available. The bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation (BFOQ) defense, specifically provided for in the statute, 6
Ill. 1981) (FCN Treaty does not protect domestically incorporated subsidiaries of a
Japanese parent company); Shiseido Cosmetics (Am.), Ltd. v. State Human Rights
Appeal Board, 72 A.D.2d 711, 421 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1979) (mem.) (employment poli-
cies of a Japanese subsidiary do not discriminate on the basis of national origin), aff-'d
mem., 52 N.Y.2d 916, 419 N.E.2d 346, 437 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1981).
13. 102 S. Ct. at 2378. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., is a New York-incorpo-
rated, wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese general trading company. General
trading companies market Japanese products, participate in the importation to Japan
of raw materials and manufactured products, and play a significant role in financing
Japan's international trade. Id. at 2376 n.1. See generally A. Young, The Sogo
Shosha: Japan's Multinational Trading Companies (1979) (discussion of Japanese
general trading companies).
14. 102 S. Ct. at 2378-79. The Supreme Court, however, "beclouded the issue,"
3 A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 95A.10, at 20-41 (1982 &
Supp. 1982), when it asserted that "[w]e also express no view as to whether Sumi-
tomo may assert any [treaty] rights of its parent," 102 S. Ct. at 2382 n.19. The
meaning of this statement is unclear, but it seems to imply that although Sumitomo
on its own may not be able to invoke the FCN Treaty exemption, the subsidiary may
have standing to assert the treaty rights of its parent.
Another means by which a locally incorporated subsidiary can take advantage of
the treaty exemption is to reorganize into a branch of the parent company. Avagliano
v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1981) (Japanese subsidiaries
could use the treaty exemption by "transforming ... wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries
into branches."), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); Spiess v. C. Itoh &
Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 1981) (Reavley, J., dissenting) ("If a company
of Japan wishes to safeguard a few superior legal rights under the Treaty, it may
choose to do business in the form of a branch office."), vacated and remanded, 102 S.
Ct. 2951 (1982); United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D.
Cal. 1957) (If defendant subsidiary "had wished to retain its status as a Japanese
corporation while doing business in this country, it could easily have operated
through a branch."); see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374,
2382 (1982).
15. 102 S. Ct. at 2382 n.19. The Court did not express an opinion whether the
defenses to a Title VII action would be available to the Japanese. The Court did
recognize, however, that "[t]here can be little doubt that some positions in a Japanese
controlled company doing business in the United States call for great familiarity with
not only the language of Japan, but also the culture, customs, and business practices
of that country." Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1)(1976). This section provides:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees ... on the basis of [their] religion, sex, or national
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shields a discriminatory hiring practice from Title VII's proscription if
it is essential to the proper operation of an employer's business. 17 This
statutory exception is available only to defend those discriminatory
employment policies that are purposely based on a prohibited crite-
rion.18 For instance, an employer's announced policy of not hiring
females can be continued under Title VII only if being male qualifies
as a BFOQ for the position in question.' 9
Title VII also prohibits those practices which are facially neutral
but discriminatory in impact. 20 The disparate impact theory was
established by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,21 in
which the scope of Title VII was expanded to include not only inten-
tionally discriminatory practices, but also those practices which have
an adverse impact upon the employment prospects of a protected
group. 22 Despite the expanded coverage of Title VII, under the dispar-
ate impact theory such employment practices may be justified by the
judicially created business necessity defense.2 3 Although discrimina-
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id. Race may never qualify as a BFOQ. 110 Cong. Rec. 2548 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Celler); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law 244 & n.25
(1976).
17. See infra notes 51-70 and accompanying text.
18. E.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 369-70 & n.13 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 163,
vacated, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Harriss v.
Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 674 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1980); B. Schlei & P.
Grossman, supra note 16, at 292; Note, Language Discrimination Under Title VII:
The Silent Right of National Origin Discrimination, 15 J. Mar. L. Rev. 667, 672 &
n.22 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Language Discrimination]. But see Garcia v. Rush-
Presbyterian Medical Center, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1556, 1560 (7th Cir.
1981) (applying the BFOQ defense in a disparate impact case).
19. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336 (1977) (requirement that
prison guards be male is a BFOQ); Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp.
1191, 1195-96 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (policy of excluding male nurses from the labor and
delivery section of its obstetrics and gynecology department is a BFOQ), vacated as
moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982).
20. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); accord Furnco Constr.
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 137 (1976); see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. See id. at 431.
23. See id. The business necessity defense, like the disparate impact theory, has
no basis in Title VII. Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the Civil Rights- Act
of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 Yale L.J. 98, 98 (1974) ("The business
necessity doctrine thus adopted in Griggs appears in neither the explicit language nor
the legislative history of the 1964 Act.") [hereinafter cited as Business Necessity]; see
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 950-
51(1982).
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tory in operation, these practices may be continued if the employer
can show that they are compelled by some nondiscriminatory business
purpose. 24
Unfortunately, the challenged employment practices of the Japa-
nese do not lend themselves to simple classification within the tradi-
tional applications of these defenses. If favoring Japanese citizens is
equated with national origin discrimination, the BFOQ is the relevant
defense. Conversely, if the citizenship qualification is viewed as a
neutral hiring criterion that adversely impacts a protected group, the
business necessity defense must be applied. Thus, in resolving this
controversy, it is essential to consider both possible routes of court
adjudication.
Part I of this Note discusses whether the hiring practices of the
Japanese multinationals constitute an intentional violation of the stat-
ute, the availability of the BFOQ defense, and whether the traditional
BFOQ analysis may properly be applied in cases of national origin
discrimination. 25 Part II considers whether the employment qualifica-
24. E.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 583 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431-32 (1971).
The business necessity defense and the BFOQ exception apply in different
instances. Some courts, however, have confused their application, and have used
them interchangeably. E.g., Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, 458 F. Supp. 474, 496 n.1
(E.D. Va. 1978) ("As a practical matter ... the Court sees little difference between
the two tests."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part per curiam, 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 437 F. Supp.
413, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (defendant's discriminatory policy sustained as a "business
necessity/B.F.O.Q."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 649 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1980).
25. The BFOQ defense has never been offered to rebut a charge of national
origin discrimination. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 95.40; B. Schlei &
P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 267; see S. Agid, Fair Employment Litigation;
Proving and Defending a Title VII Case 532 (2d ed. 1979). All arguments, therefore,
will be derived from the legislative history of Title VII and analogies to claims of sex
and age discrimination.
Principles of sex discrimination law are applicable to cases of national origin
discrimination. Hollon & Bright, National Origin Harassment in the Work Place:
Recent Guideline Developments from the EEOC, 8 Employee Rel. L.J. 282, 282
(1982). Moreover, although age discrimination is not proscribed by Title VII, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) contains a provision that is
virtually identical to the BFOQ exemption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The ADEA provides that it is not unlawful for an employer to discriminate on
the basis of age "where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)
(1976). In analogous situations, many courts have applied the Title VII BFOQ
analysis to this similar provision of the ADEA. See, e.g., Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co.,
675 F.2d 842, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1982); Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98,
100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,
234-35 (5th Cir. 1976).
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tion is discriminatory in impact, 26 even if not an intentional violation
of Title VII, and the availability of the business necessity defense. This
Note concludes that these two defenses, as traditionally applied, are
not available to the Japanese in defending their current hiring prac-
tices. In light of the legislative history of Title VII, however, the
argument is made that a more lenient BFOQ standard should be
applied in cases of national origin discrimination. Conversely, should
the business necessity defense be found relevant, despite the recent
trend towards a more liberal application of the defense, the existence
of a less restrictive alternative selection procedure should preclude the
Japanese from continuing their present employment practices.
26. The Japanese employment practices are not violative of Title VII the under
discriminatory treatment theory. This theory, articulated in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies when an individual alleges that he has
been subject to disparate treatment because he belongs to a protected group. Id. at
802; see Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2536 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581-82 (1978) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36
n.15 (1977). The disparate treatment theory applies only to private, non-class action
suits, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); 2 A. Larson &
L. Larson, supra note 14, § 50.10, at 10-4, while the disparate impact analysis
applies also to class actions, see Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct.
2374, 2375 (1982). But see Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv., No. 80-
3212, slip op. at 2969 (5th Cir. Mar. 11, 1983). In addition, disparate treatment
involves covertly discriminatory practices, while a BFOQ analysis concerns only
overtly discriminatory hiring policies. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) (failure to rehire employee was a result of unexpressed racial
bias) with Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (state rule prohibiting employ-
ment of women as prison guards). See generally Bartholet, supra note 23, at 947, 965
n.58, 1004-06 (comparing the discriminatory treatment and discriminatory impact
theories). Proof of discriminatory intent in a disparate treatment case is critical.
Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2537 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1978); 2 A. Larson &
L. Larson, supra note 14, § 50.40, at 10-40. A disparate impact case, on the other
hand, involves the validity of a facially neutral hiring criterion or testing device
which has an adverse impact on a protected group. Proof of discriminatory intent,
therefore, is irrelevant. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2537 (1982) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805-06 (1973). One
commentator suggests, however, that the Supreme Court is moving toward a synthe-
sis of the two types of cases. Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact
and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After
Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. Rev. 419, 419-20 (1982); see Grove v. Frostburg Nat'l
Bank, 549 F. Supp. 922, 938 n.11 (D. Md. 1982) (effect of disparate treatment
analysis upon discriminatory impact theory is unclear). But see Hung Ping Wang v.
Hoffman, 694 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1982) ("criteria for disparate treatment cases
do not apply to disparate impact cases" (emphasis in original)).
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I. AVAILABILITY OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE
A. Citizenship as National Origin Discrimination
While Title VII prohibits all hiring decisions that are based on
national origin,27 the Japanese multinationals have been accused of
discriminatory practices that are predicated strictly upon an individ-
ual's citizenship. 2 The important question, therefore, is whether hir-
ing on the basis of citizenship constitutes national origin discrimina-
tion. The statute provides no guidance; Title VII contains no
definition of national origin.2 9 In the brief legislative debates that
preceded the passage of the statute, it was suggested that national
origin "means the country from which you or your forebears came
from." 30 Thus, the debates do not indicate whether Congress intended
to include citizenship within the concept of national origin.3'
The Supreme Court first considered the issue in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co.,32 in which it was alleged that the refusal to hire
an applicant because of her Mexican citizenship violated Title VII. 33
The Court held that a refusal to hire those who lack United States
citizenship does not by itself constitute national origin discrimina-
tion.34 The Court did recognize, however, that in certain instances, a
citizenship requirement may be prohibited if it is "part of a wider
scheme of unlawful national-origin discrimination." 3 In Espinoza,
the employer did not discriminate against those of Mexican ancestry-
ninety-six percent of the employees of the subject division were of
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
28. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); see
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 355 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and
remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982); Porto v. Canon, U.S.A., Inc., 29 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 32,903, at 26,283 n.3 (N.D. Il. 1981).
29. H. Anderson, Primer of Equal Employment Opportunity 47 (1978); 3 A.
Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 93.20, at 20-3; B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra
note 16, at 246. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guide-
lines contain a definition of national origin. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1982). The guide-
lines provide that national origin discrimination should be defined "broadly as in-
cluding, but not limited to, the denial of equal employment opportunity because of
an individual's, or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has
the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." Id.
30. 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt).
31. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973) ("The statute's legislative
history [is] quite meager.").
32. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
33. Id. at 87.
34. Id. at 95-96. Justice Douglas, writing in dissent, argued that a citizenship
requirement is always national origin discrimination because aliens are entitled to the
same protection as citizens of the United States. See id. at 96 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
35. Id. at 92.
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Mexican descent. 36 The citizenship requirement, therefore, was up-
held. 37 Subsequently, courts confronted with the issue presented in
Espinoza have consistently found that citizenship is distinct from the
concept of national origin discrimination. 3
The employment practices of the Japanese subsidiaries, however,
may present one of the rare instances when citizenship and national
origin can be equated. Unlike the situation in Espinoza, the Japanese
citizenship requirement can be seen as a pretext for national origin
discrimination. Japan is a homogeneous country-ninety-nine per-
cent of its population is of Japanese ancestry. 39 Consequently, a citi-
zenship qualification creates a work force which almost exclusively
consists of those of Japanese national origin. Because favoring one
national origin results in discrimination against all other ethnic
groups, 40 the practice of favoring Japanese citizens in this instance
may be equated with intentional national origin discrimination.
36. Id. at 93.
37. Id. at 95-96.
38. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) ("National origin must
not be confused with. . . citizenship."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981); Ramirez
v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163, 167 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980) ("The 1964 act does not apply to
employment discrimination on the basis of alienage."); Jalil v. Campbell, 590 F.2d
1120, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (national origin does not equal alienage);
Lopez v. Arrowhead Ranches, 523 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 1975) (Title VII does not
"bar discrimination on the basis of alienage."); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal
Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1974) ("Like Mrs. Espinoza, [plaintiff] has
failed to demonstrate that he suffered from discrimination based on his national
origin rather than on his status as an alien."); Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp.
1018, 1022 (D. Mass. 1979) ("Title VII. . . does not bar employment discrimination
based on citizenship."); Chavez-Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158, 165 n.13 (C.D.
Cal. 1977) (Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on alienage), vacated
and remanded sub. nom. County of Los Angeles v. Chavez-Salido, 436 U.S. 901
(1978); cf. Nguyen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 513 F. Supp. 1039, 1040 (N.D. Tex.
1981) (Equal Credit Opportunity Act does not equate national origin with alienage).
But see Caton v. Canal Zone Gov't, 522 F. Supp. 1, 13 (D.C.Z. 1981) (court
construes a citizenship requirement as national origin discrimination), aff'd per
curiam, 669 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 19821.
39. D. Whitaker, Area Handbook for Japan 70 (3d ed. 1974); Brief for Respon-
dents at 18, Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); see M.
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 162; Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil
Rights Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 947, 959 n.60 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Case of Japanese Employers].
40. B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 256 ("[T]he requirement that an
employee be trained in a foreign country, if not job-related, violates Title VII where
its purpose is to employ persons of a particular national origin. Discrimination in
favor of a particular national origin is tantamount to discriminating against all other
national origins.") (footnotes omitted); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971) ("Discriminatory preference for any group . . . is precisely . . . what
Congress ... proscribed."); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 95.70, at 20-
39 (" 'reverse' discrimination is as much subject to Title VII as any other" form of
discrimination).
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In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) guidelines interpreting Title VII also lend support to a claim
that the Japanese citizenship requirement constitutes national origin
discrimination. 4' The guidelines provide that "[i]n those circum-
stances, where citizenship requirements have the purpose ... of dis-
criminating against an individual on the basis of national origin, they
are prohibited by Title VII." 42 Pursuant to this interpretation, the
Japanese subsidiaries' policy of favoring Japanese citizens for manage-
rial positions may well constitute an intentional violation of Title VII.
Although no courts have relied on the EEOC's interpretation, 43 the
guidelines are entitled to "great deference." 4
4
B. Citizenship as a BFOQ
1. The Traditional BFOQ Defense
Title VII contains an exception which provides:
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
hire and employ employees . . .on the basis of [their] religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness .... 45
This provision is applicable solely to those practices that are consid-
ered purposely discriminatory, 46 and will be available to the Japanese
employers as a defense only if the citizenship criterion is equated with
national origin discrimination. 47 The exception, however, is narrowly
construed by both the EEOC guidelines4 and judicial interpreta-
41. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.5(a) (1982).
42. Id.
43. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 97.10, at 20-52. It has been
suggested that this guideline adds nothing to the interpretation of the statute. If the
purpose of an alienage requirement is national origin discrimination, the citizenship
qualification is already within the purview of Title VII, with or without reference to
the guideline. Therefore, it has been asserted, it is "not surprising" that no cases have
relied on the EEOC's interpretation of the statute. Id.
44. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); accord General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-41 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973); cf.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (rulings of the Administrator of
the Fair Labor Standards Act "constitute a body of experience and informed judg-
ment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance").
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1976).
46. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
48. The EEOC guidelines on national origin discrimination assert that the BFOQ
exception "shall be strictly construed." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (1982). A similar admoni-
tion exists in the Commission's guidelines on sex discrimination, which provide that
879
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tion.49 Only those discriminatory practices that are absolutely essen-
tial to a business operation have been found to be within the narrow
purview of the BFOQ defense. 50
In determining whether a purposely discriminatory job qualifica-
tion constitutes a BFOQ, courts have most frequently applied a two-
pronged test. 51 The first prong was developed in Weeks v. Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,52 in which a policy of not hiring
women for the job of switchman was challenged as discriminatory.5 3
In finding a violation of Title VII, the court held that "in order to rely
on the [BFOQ] exception an employer has the burden of proving that
he had reasonable cause to believe ... that all or substantially all
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
"the bona fide occupational qualification exception as to sex shall be interpreted
narrowly." Id. § 1604.2(a). Finally, the guidelines applicable to the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act propose that the BFOQ defense "will have limited scope and
application [and] must be construed narrowly." Id. § 860.102(b).
49. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) ("We are persuaded-by the
restrictive language of [the defense], the relevant legislative history, and the consist-
ent interpretation of the [EEOC]-that the bfoq exception was in fact meant to be an
extremely narrow exception ...."); see Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d
303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982); Burwell v. Eastern
Airlines, 633 F.2d 361, 370 n.15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981);
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 1085 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980); Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Mich.
1982); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 298-99 (N.D. Tex. 1981). But
see Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176-77 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (use of
a liberal BFOQ test), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 934 (1978); S. Agid, supra note 25, at
533 (court in Condit uses a "diluted version" of the BFOQ test).
50. The burden of proving a BFOQ, however, is not insurmountable. The de-
fense is most often successful when the discriminatory criterion has a positive effect
on public safety. E.g., Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (maximum age limit for applicants for a position as airline pilot), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982); Condit v. United Air Lines, 558 F.2d 1176, 1176 (4th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (policy of refusing to allow stewardesses to fly from the time they
learned they were pregnant found valid, since pregnancy may interfere with the
stewardesses' duties relating to the safe operation of the aircraft), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 934 (1978); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir.
1976) (maximum age for employment as bus driver); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines,
499 F.2d 859, 861 (7th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); cf.
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977) (rule prohibiting female prison
guards found valid due to risk of sexual assault).
51. See, e.g., Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 844 (6th Cir. 1982);
Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 491 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Smallwood v. United Air
Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982);
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980); Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
531 F.2d 224, 234-35 (5th Cir. 1976). But see Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698,
703 & n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (use of a four-pronged test).
52. 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
53. Id. at 230.
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the job involved." 54 The court added, however, that if it is impossible
to test for the qualifications on an individualized basis, a "reasonable
general rule" such as a sex qualification would be justified. 55
The second prong of the test was formulated in Diaz v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways,56 in which a class action was brought charging
that Pan American's policy of not employing males as cabin attend-
ants violated Title VII.5 7 The court held that in order to justify a
challenged practice as a BFOQ, the employer must show that without
the discriminatory hiring criteria, "the essence of [his] business opera-
tion would be undermined. '5 8 Although the court acknowledged that
a female flight attendant may be able to perform certain "non-me-
chanical" functions on an airplane better than most men,5 9 it also
noted that being female did not relate to the primary function of an
airline-the safe transportation of passengers. 60 In this instance, the
goals of the discriminatory hiring criteria did not relate to the "es-
sence" of the business operation. Thus, the court held, the policy of
hiring only females did not qualify as a BFOQ. 6
In Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc. ,U2 the court proposed that
the tests enunciated in Weeks and in Diaz be used concurrently. 63 In
Tamiami, a policy of denying employment as bus drivers to applicants
over age forty was challenged as age discrimination. 64 The court
found that the discriminatory practice was unquestionably related to
the "essence" of the bus company's business-the safe transportation
of passengers.6 5 Therefore, the Diaz prong was easily satisfied. The
Weeks facet of the test, however, presented a greater obstacle. The
defendant-employer had not shown that "all or substantially all"
individuals over age forty were unable to operate a bus safely. 6  The
bus company did establish through expert testimony, however, that it
was extremely difficult to determine when an individual's age would
54. Id. at 235.
55. Id. at 235 n.5.
56. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S 950 (1971).
57. Id. at 385-86.
58. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
59. Id. at 387-88. These non-mechanical functions include the superior ability to
provide psychological assurance to anxious passengers, giving "courteous personal-
ized service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible within the
limitations imposed by aircraft operations." Id. at 387 (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 311 F. Supp. 559, 563 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd and remanded, 442
F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
60. Id. at 388.
61. Id. at 388-89.
62. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. See id. at 235-36 & n.27.
64. Id. at 226.
65. Id. at 236.
66. Id.
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begin to interfere with his driving ability.67 The use of a general age
limit, therefore, was necessary to the safe and efficient operation of
the bus company's business .6  Consequently, the combined Weeks-
Diaz test had been met by the defendant, and therefore the discrimi-
natory age criterion was held to constitute a BFOQ.6 9 Most courts
since Tamiami have applied this two-step method of analysis when
determining whether a discriminatory hiring criterion can be justified
by the BFOQ defense.7 0
2. The Case for a More Liberal Analysis
This traditional analysis of the BFOQ exception, however, may not
be entirely appropriate in the case of Japanese subsidiaries, which
presents a question of national origin discrimination.7 ' Not only has
the exception evolved in the areas of sex and age discrimination, 72 but
more importantly, the legislative history of Title VII indicates that the
BFOQ defense should be liberally applied in this area.7 3
While no committee reports exist, during the House debates Repre-
sentative Rodino gave an example of permissible national origin dis-
crimination under the BFOQ exception. The Congressman suggested
that an owner of a pizzeria "would probably seek as chef a person of
67. Id. at 237-38.
68. Id. at 238.
69. id.
70. E.g., Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1982);
Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 491 & n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Smallwood v. United
Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2299 (1982);
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980); Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977).
71. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), rev'd in part, 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); see
Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 469 F. Supp. 1, 2 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd and
remanded, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982).
72, E.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976)
(age); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (sex), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969) (sex).
73. B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 267. The congressional debates
that preceded the enactment of Title VII are especially important. In the Senate, the
bill did not go through the usual committee procedure, but instead was discussed in
informal bipartisan conferences. Consequently, neither a committee report, nor a
Senate-House conference report, was written. EEOC, Legislative History of Titles
VII and IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, at 3001 [hereinafter cited as Legis. Hist.].
The statements made prior to the adoption of the statute, therefore, are the only
guides available to aid in the determination of the congressional intent. Id.; Sirota,
Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 1025, 1027 (1977); Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Indus. and
Com. L. Rev. 431, 457-58 (1966); Language Discrimination, supra note 18, at 667 &
n.2.
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Italian origin. He would do this because pizza pie is something he
believes . . . people of Italian national origin are able to make better
than others-and is reasonably necessary to the operation of his par-
ticular business."'7 4 The Congressman's suggestion seems to indicate
that a mere showing that a person of one national origin is perceived
to be better qualified to perform the duties of a certain job is sufficient
to justify the hiring criteria as a BFOQ. Certainly, this interpretation
of the statutory exception is more lenient than the tests commonly
applied to the BFOQ defense.75
The remarks of Representative Roosevelt also suggest that a fairly
liberal standard should be applied when determining whether a hiring
criterion based on national origin qualifies as a BFOQ.7 6 When asked
whether it would be permissible to advertise for an employee of a
particular ethnic group, the Congressman asserted that "if you were
to have a Polish organization I do not think that they [would] want to
have me as a Dutchman. . . and they would have a right to say
something about [all applicants being] Polish in their advertise-
ment. '77 Moreover, the interpretative memorandum on Title VII
introduced by Senators Clark and Case 78 indicates that "the prefer-
ence of a French restaurant for a French cook" would be a permissible
basis of discrimination pursuant to the BFOQ defense under Title
VII. 7 These comments evince a congressional intent to construe the
BFOQ defense rather liberally in the area of national origin discrimi-
nation.A0
74. 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964) (statement of Rep. Rodino). When no committee
reports are written, the statements made by one legislator, although probably not
controlling, "are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction" and "are the
only . . . indications of congressional intent." North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102
S. Ct. 1912, 1920-21 (1982).
75. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he congressional intent inferred
from the legislative history of Title VII . . . contrasts sharply with the narrow inter-
pretation of the BFOQ provision currently employed by the courts." Sirota, supra
note 73, at 1032. But see Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 567 F.2d 429, 475 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (when congressional intent is unclear, courts traditionally resolve ambiguities
in Title VII "in favor of those whom the legislation was designed to protect"), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
76. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Roosevelt).
77. Id.
78. Senators Clark and Case were the Senate floor managers of the House-
approved bill. Legis. Hist., supra note 73, at 3001. Their responsibilities included
explaining Title VII in detail, defending it, and leading additional discussion on the
legislation. Vaas, supra note 73, at 445. The written interpretative memorandum of
the Senators should also be given great weight in the absence of any committee
reports. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1921 (1982).
79. Legis. Hist., supra note 73, at 3040.
80. Title VII was designed primarily to protect blacks from invidious discrimina-
tion. In fact, the addition of "sex" to the list of prohibited categories met opposition;
it was felt that the amendment would "clutter up the bill" and "jeopardize [the]
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C. The Japanese Multinationals and the BFOQ Defense
1. Justifications for the Citizenship Requirement
In the context of the Japanese citizenship requirement, the employ-
ers will contend that citizenship is a BFOQ for most managerial
positions within their subsidiary operations. They may argue that
their management philosophy is so fundamentally different from pre-
vailing Western attitudes that only an individual intimately familiar
with the workings of a Japanese corporation could effectively operate
within the United States-based subsidiary. Undoubtedly, the prob-
lems that an American would face functioning within a Japanese-
controlled company are manifold.8' The language barrier, for exam-
ple, presents a formidable obstacle; 82 few Americans are sufficiently
fluent in Japanese to communicate effectively with either their Japa-
nese co-workers or the representatives of the parent company. 3 Be-
cause of the strong ties that usually exist between the subsidiary and its
Japanese parent, this communication problem is significant. 84
Another important difference between the two systems is that the
loyalty existing between employers and employees in a Japanese cor-
poration is unparalleled in any Western nation. A Japanese employee
is given lifetime employment;85 the employer receives in return a
worker who is devoted to the successful operation of the company.88
An American worker, on the other hand, would probably have signifi-
cant difficulty in adjusting to such a paternalistic environment in light
primary purpose" of the statute, 110 Cong. Ree. 2581 (1964) (remarks of Rep.
Green). Thus, it can be argued, justifications for national origin discrimination
should not be as strictly construed as a defense to a charge of racial discrimination
under Title VII.
81. See Y. Tsurumi, Japanese Business 108-13 (1978); Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2,
at 262; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168-71; Johnson & Ouchi, Made in America
(Under Japanese Management), in Managing and Organizing Multinational Corpo-
rations 495 (S. Davis ed. 1979).
82. M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168; see T. Gladwin & I. Walter, supra note 2,
at 408. The Supreme Court has noted that certain positions within a Japanese-
controlled, U.S.-based subsidiary necessitate a "great familiarity" with the language
of Japan. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 102 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 n.19 (1982).
83. See M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168.
84. Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 262; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168-71; see Y.
Tsurumi, The Multinational Spread of Japanese Firms and Asian Neighbors' Reac-
tions, in the Multinational Corporation and Social Change 118, 143 (D. Apter & L.
Goodman eds. 1976).
85. A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 18; W. Ouchi, Theory Z 15-22 (1981); S.
Sethi, Japanese Business and Social Conflict 60-62 (1975); M. Yoshino, supra note 3,
at 163; Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3, at 504.
86. M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 163; see J. Fayerweather, International Business
Management: A Conceptual Framework 62 (1969); Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3,
at 493.
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of the individualistic nature of Western society.8 7 In addition, the
group orientation that pervades every aspect of a Japanese company,""
a result of the socioeconomic environment of Japan,8 9 would also be
quite alien to an American, accustomed as he is to the competitive
atmosphere fostered in most United States corporations.
The most significant obstacle an American manager would face,
however, is adjusting to the Ringi system-the Japanese decision-
making process.9 0 This unusual procedure is often referred to as "deci-
sion-making by consensus.""' Each idea originates at a lower echelon
of the organizational hierarchy. 2 The suggestion is then passed up
through the ranks, with each executive adding his comments and
eventually giving his approval. 3 Although this process is painstakingly
slow,9 4 the final decision is the responsibility of the entire group,
rather than the burden of one individual who occupies the leadership
role. 5 The proper functioning of "decision-making by consensus" de-
pends on both a sharing of values within the group and a common
understanding of company goals.9 6 Without these common values, a
decision could never be reached. Thus, the Japanese maintain that
only citizens of Japan can effectively hold managerial positions within
the American-based subsidiary, for they alone are familiar with these
methods.9 7
87. Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 81, at 500; see W. Ouchi, supra note 85, at 44-
47.
88. M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 162-64; see S. Sethi, supra note 85, at 41-45; Y.
Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 220.
89. See M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 161-62; Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3, at
503-04.
90. See R. Clark, The Japanese Company 126-27 (1979); W. Ouchi, supra note
85, at 36-39; S. Sethi, supra note 85, at 50-52; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 165-66;
Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3, at 506-08.
91. A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 14; W. Ouchi, supra note 85, at 36; S. Sethi,
supra note 85, at 51-56; Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3, at 506; see Johnson & Ouchi,
supra note 81, at 500-01 (decision by consensus).
92. R. Clark, supra note 90, at 127; A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 14; S. Sethi,
supra note 85, at 51; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 165; Johnson & Ouchi, supra note
81, at 496-97; Sethi & Swanson, supra note 3, at 507.
93. A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 14; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 165; Sethi &
Swanson, supra note 3, at 507.
94. See A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 15; W. Ouchi, supra note 85, at 37; S.
Sethi, supra note 85, at 55.
95. W. Ouchi, supra note 85, at 39; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 165-66; Johnson
& Ouchi, supra note 81, at 496.
96. W. Ouchi, supra note 85, at 38-39; see M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168.
97. See Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 262. It has been argued that the policy of
staffing subsidiaries with Japanese citizens actually hampers the operation of the
company. The commentators suggest that the Japanese management system is a
product of its national environment and cannot be exported with success. The
practice, it is argued, fosters resentment within the host company, places a strain on
the number of qualified Japanese managers available and results in tremendous cost
to the parent (the cost of maintaining a manager abroad is double what it would be
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2. Applying Tamiami
As persuasive as these arguments may seem, the traditional
Tamiami test9s precludes finding that Japanese citizenship is a BFOQ
for managerial positions within United States-based operations. Al-
though productivity certainly would be hampered by having an
American who is unfamiliar with the Japanese system occupy a mana-
gerial position,99 it cannot be said that "all or substantially all" Ameri-
cans would be unable to perform such a job. In addition, because it
would be possible to test prospective job applicants for qualities which
would make them effective managers within the subsidiary, a general
Japanese citizenship requirement will not be justified under the Weeks
exception. 00 Finally, the "essence" of the business would not be im-
paired if the Japanese were forced to use nondiscriminatory hiring
policies; their operations would merely be less efficient.'10 Therefore,
if the traditional analysis of the exception is applied, the BFOQ
defense would not be available to the Japanese in defending their
discriminatory employment policies.
3. Applying the Liberal Analysis
In light of the legislative history which preceded the passage of Title
VII, courts should not be obliged to apply blindly the traditionally
rigorous BFOQ analysis.10 2 Certainly, the justifications of the Japa-
nese are as compelling as the examples given in the congressional
debates. The desire to give authenticity to a French restaurant pales in
comparison with the actual business needs of the Japanese in employ-
ing managerial personnel who are fully acquainted with their unusual
management system. Hiring a French cook to work in a French
restaurant is merely an attempt to increase customer appeal, and is
not compelled by any actual business need. Courts have consistently
held that such third party preference is insufficient to justify a dis-
criminatory practice as a BFOQ. 0 3 The subsidiaries' practice of favor-
ing Japanese citizens for managerial positions, on the other hand, goes
in Japan). Thus, it is asserted, these practices actually hinder the effective expansion
of Japan's multinational companies. A. Dickerman, supra note 2, at 96; M. Yoshino,
supra note 3, at 161, 175-76.
98. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
99. M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 177; see Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 81, at
497.
100. See Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.5 (5th Cir.
1969). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
101. M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 177; see Johnson & Ouchi, supra note 81, at
497.
102. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
103. E.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981)
(refusal to find being male as a BFOQ for a position that requires traveling in
countries that bar women from business); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d
385, 389 (5th Cir.) (to allow customer preference to dominate would encourage
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beyond third party preference to the actual business needs of the
company. They are not trying to please potential customers, but
rather are trying to operate their businesses more efficiently. 0 4 Al-
though traditional BFOQ analysis would preclude finding that the
practices of the subsidiaries are justified, 10 5 perhaps a more lenient
approach, as indicated by the legislative history, 10 6 should be applied
with respect to the charge of national origin discrimination under
these circumstances.10
II. DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT THEORY
A. Neutral Employment Criteria that are Discriminatory
in Operation
Originally, Title VII applied only to those hiring criteria that were
purposely based on an impermissible classification. 08 The Supreme
prejudices that Title VII was intended to overcome), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971); American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 23 Misc. 2d 446, 448, 190 N.Y.S.2d
218, 220-21 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (refusal to hire Jews in the American operations of a
Saudi Arabian company found not to be a BFOQ), aff'd per curiam, 10 A.D.2d 833,
199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 173 N.E.2d 788, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60
(1961); see 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (a)(1)(iii) (1982) ("refusal to hire an individual
because of the preferences of... customers" is not a BFOQ). But see EEOC v.
Sambo's of Ga., Inc., 530 F. Supp. 86, 91 (N.D. Ga. 1981) ("[I]t is not the law that
customer preference is an insufficient justification as a matter of law."); Wilson v.
Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 (N.D. Tex. 1981) ("[C]ourts have held ...
that customer preference for one sex may be taken into account in those limited
instances where satisfying customer preference is [a BFOQ].").
104. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
107. The United States has recognized the importance of staffing a branch of a
foreign corporation with whomever the company chooses. The FCN Treaty does give
the parties an opportunity to hire personnel "of their choice." Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Japan, art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. The United States is currently bound by over 100 FCN
Treaties, all of which are designed to promote commercial activities between the
signatories. Note, Amenability of Foreign Corporations to United States Employ-
ment Discrimination Laws, 14 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 197, 198 (1981).
Although the Japanese subsidiaries have chosen to incorporate within the United
States, and therefore cannot avail themselves of the FCN Treaty exemption, the need
to hire personnel of their choice still exists. It has been suggested that if a Japanese
corporation was intent upon taking advantage of the treaty rights, it could transform
its wholly owned subsidiary into a branch of the parent, and thereby use the "of their
choice" language of the FCN Treaty. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 638
F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982); United States v. R.P.
Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1957); Sethi & Swanson, supra note
3, at 514. This possibility seems unlikely, however, due to the negative tax conse-
quences of restructuring. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 369 (5th Cir.
1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 2951 (1982).
108. M. Miner & J. Miner, Employee Selection Within The Law 6-8 (1978); see
Bartholet, supra note 23, 950-51; Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to
887
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Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 10 9 however, expanded the scope
of the statute to prohibit those employment qualifications that are
neutral on their face but discriminatory in effect. "0 In Griggs, blacks
challenged an employer's policy of requiring a high school degree or
the passing of an intelligence test as a condition of employment."'
The plaintiffs argued that the requirement, while not related to job
performance, had an adverse impact on the employment prospects of
minorities." 2 The Supreme Court, in a momentous decision," 3 held
that it was irrelevant that the employer lacked a discriminatory in-
tent;" 4 it was sufficient that the challenged practice operated to
discriminate on the basis of race." 5 Therefore, those policies that
appear to be legitimate may still be prohibited if they are discrimina-
tory in operation and adversely affect the employment prospects of a
protected group.""
Under the disparate impact theory, even if citizenship is not
equated with national origin," 7 the employment practices of the Japa-
nese will be found to discriminate because almost all citizens of Japan
are of Japanese national origin." 8 The effect of favoring Japanese
citizens in employment decisions, therefore, is to create a managerial
work force that is made up entirely of individuals of Japanese national
origin. Discriminating in favor of one national origin is tantamount to
discriminating against all other ethnic groups." 9 Thus, the defend-
ants' policy of giving preferential treatment to Japanese citizens ad-
versely impacts those who are not of Japanese ancestry. 20 Conse-
quently, even absent -an intentional violation of the statute, the
Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 911, 911 & n.3
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Disparate Impact Liability].
109. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
110. Id. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation." (emphasis in original)).
111. Id. at 425-26.
112. Id. at 426.
113. Griggs has been described as "the most important court decision in employ-
ment discrimination law." B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 5.
114. 401 U.S. at 432.
115. Id. at 431.
116. See id.
117. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
118. D. Whitaker, supra note 39, at 70; Brief for Respondents at 18, Avagliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., 456 U.S. , (1982).
119. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("Discriminatory pref-
erence for any group ... is precisely ... what Congress has proscribed."); see 3 A.
Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 95.70, at 20-39; B. Schlei & P. Grossman,
supra note 16, at 256. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
120. See infra note 124.
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personnel policies of the subsidiaries implicate Title VII because their
effect is to discriminate on the basis of national origin.
B. The Business Necessity Defense
The business necessity defense, also established in Griggs, 12 1 is avail-
able to justify those employment policies that are found to be neutral
on their face but discriminatory in impact. 122 Unlike the BFOQ excep-
tion, the business necessity defense may not be used to justify inten-
tionally discriminatory practices. 2 3 Once a showing of adverse impact
has been made,12 4 the defendant has an opportunity to prove that his
121. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employ-
ment practice which [is discriminatory in impact] cannot be shown to be related to
job performance, the practice is prohibited."); Disparate Impact Liability, supra
note 108, at 911; Business Necessity, supra note 23, at 98; see Note, Business Neces-
sity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 Ga. L. Rev. 376,
383-84 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Search for Adequate Standards].
122. 401 U.S. at 431.
123. Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, 633 F.2d 361, 369-70 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 674
& n.2 (9th Cir. 1980); B. Schlei & P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 292-93; Language
Discrimination, supra note 18, at 672 & n.22.
124. For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie showing of adverse impact, he must
prove that the challenged qualification results in a pattern of discriminatory hiring.
New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979); Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975). To illustrate that a hiring criterion discriminates against or unduly favors
a particular group, statistical analysis of the qualified labor pool is undertaken.
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977); see 2 A. Larson & L.
Larson, supra note 14, § 50.84(a).
Much dispute has arisen as to what constitutes a qualified labor pool. If the job
skills required are the kind that people can readily acquire, the relevant labor pool is
viewed to be the general population. Conversely, if the job requires special skills,
"comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group of individ-
uals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 n.13 (1977). Thus, in
such instances, a narrower labor pool should be used to determine the discriminatory
effect of an employer's procedures. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645
F.2d 1251, 1259 n.5 (6th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178,
185 (4th Cir. 1979). It is possible, however, to establish a prima facie case "without
evidence of qualifications where the inference of discrimination is supported by a
compelling level of. . . underrepresentation in a sizeable work force [of a protected
group]." Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1259 (6th Cir.
1981); see Fisher v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (5th Cir. 1980);
Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel., Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970). Thus, a
plaintiff challenging the discriminatory practices of the Japanese subsidiaries may
rely on significant underrepresentation to establish a prima facie case, and as a result,
shift the burden to the defendant to prove a lack of qualifications in the labor pool.
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practice is compelled by a legitimate business purpose and is therefore
justified by business necessity. 25
In determining whether a challenged practice that is discriminatory
in impact may be continued, most courts have adopted a rather strict
balancing test, 126 weighing the discriminatory effect of the policy
against the employer's legitimate need for the hiring criteria. 127 The
standard analysis employed by federal courts was established in
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 28 In denying the existence of business
necessity to justify a seniority system that was racially discriminatory
in impact, the court found that "the applicable test is not merely
whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a challenged
practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate
business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe and
efficient operation of the business."' 2 9 Many courts employing this
Because the Japanese subsidiaries would maintain that an intimate knowledge of
Japanese management techniques is a valid job qualification, the above line of cases
will serve to relieve the plaintiffs of a significant evidentiary burden. See Fisher v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg., 613 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir. 1980).
125. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); accord Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975); Guy v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.
1982); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719 (1982); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
(4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); see Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
126. Disparate Impact Liability, supra note 108, at 912.
127. For an employer to have a legitimate need for a discriminatory hiring crite-
rion, the suspect qualification must be shown to be "job related." The disputed hiring
criterion must bear a relationship to the successful performance of the employment in
question. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1259 (6th Cir.
1981); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14,
§ 78.11, at 15-94. The test for job-relatedness is often said to require that the practice
be "necessary to safe and efficient job performance." E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321, 332 n. 14 (1977); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th
Cir. 1979) (quoting Dothard), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); deLaurier v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978) (same); Head v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971));
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
128. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
129. Id. at 798.
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formulation emphasize that when a discriminatory job qualification is
intended to avoid great human risks, the corresponding burden upon
the employer to prove that his practice is justified by business necessity
is lessened. 130 Other federal courts have used alternate formulations of
the test which also construe the defense extremely narrowly.1
3 1
The Supreme Court, however, has taken a more lenient view of the
business necessity defense. 132 In a series of decisions1 33 culminating
with New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer,134 and Connecticut
v. Teal,135 the Court liberally interpreted the defense and placed a
much lighter burden on the employer in justifying his discriminatory
130. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th
Cir. 1981) (quoting Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972));
Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 675 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1980);
Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972); see also B. Schlei &
P. Grossman, supra note 16, at 130, 146 (when the human risks are great, the
required showing of business necessity is reduced).
The relevance of the safety factor has also been recognized in cases that analyze the
availability of the BFOQ defense to justify a discriminatory criterion that directly
violates the statute. See, e.g., Tuohy v. Ford Motor Co., 675 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir.
1982); Murnane v. American Airlines, 667 F.2d 98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1770 (1982); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859, 863 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F.
Supp. 923, 926 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
131. See, e.g., Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir.
1980) (there must be a "compelling need" for an employer to continue his discrimina-
tory practice); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1347 (8th Cir.)
("compelling business necessity"), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); United States v. St.
Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) ("compelling need"),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (business necessity "connotes an irresistable demand"). But
see EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 1981) (showing that criterion
relates to the effective functioning of the job is sufficient); Contreras v. City of Los
Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) (test must merely predict job perform-
ance), cert. denied, 456 U.S. (1982); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645
F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981) (criterion need only promote the efficient operation
of the business); Craig v. County of Los Angeles, 626 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1980)
(test must merely bear a significant relationship to job performance), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 919 (1981).
132. Many commentators have suggested that the stringent business necessity tests
applied by lower federal courts conflict with the rather liberal Supreme Court
formulation of the defense. See, e.g., Furnish, supra note 26, at 426; Search for
Adequate Standards, supra note 121, at 420; Disparate Impact Liability, supra note
108, at 918, 933.
133. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982); New York City Transit Auth. v.
Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971).
134. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
135. 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
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practice. 136 To prove the existence of business necessity, the Court in
Beazer and Teal required only that the qualification "[bear] a 'mani-
fest relationship to the employment in question."' 137 This formulation
of the defense, which merely necessitates a relationship between the
discriminatory hiring criteria and the subject employment position, is
far more liberal than the test applied by the lower courts which
requires that there be an overriding business purpose that is "necessary
to safe and efficient job performance." 138 Despite the Supreme Court's
willingness to apply the business necessity defense rather liberally by
lessening the defendant's burden in justifying a practice that is dis-
criminatory in impact, numerous federal courts continue to apply an
extremely strict standard. 139
136. Only in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), was the lower courts'
formulation of the business necessity defense even mentioned. In a footnote, the
Court stated that "a discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." Id.
at 332 n. 14. In subsequent discussions of the business necessity defense, however, the
Court has retreated from this strict interpretation. Furnish, supra note 26, at 428-29;
see Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719 (1982).
137. 102 S. Ct. at 2531 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971)); 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 (same). It is arguable, however, that the Supreme
Court's liberal interpretation of the business necessity defense in Beazer was influ-
enced by the public safety considerations involved in the case. In Beazer, the Transit
Authority (TA) sought to exclude methadone maintenance users from employment.
Many of the positions within the TA, such as subway motorman and city bus driver,
involved danger to the public. Id. at 571. If a question of public safety arises, the
corresponding burden of proof upon an employer to show business necessity is
reduced. Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972). See supra
note 130 and accompanying text. Thus, the lenient formulation of the defense in
Beazer may be a reflection of public safety considerations, and should not be unduly
relied upon. In Teal, however, the Court also interpreted the business necessity
defense rather liberally, even absent questions of public safety. See id. at 2531.
138. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1377 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928
(1980); e.g., deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th
Cir. 1978); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973);
Robinson v. Lorillard Co., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
139. See, e.g., Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir.
1980); Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872
(1980); Communications Workers v. South Cent. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 F. Supp.
240, 246 (E.D. La. 1981); Furnish, supra note 26, at 426; Search For Adequate
Standards, supra note 121, at 420; Disparate Impact Liability, supra note 108, at
912. In light of Teal and Beazer, however, it is now difficult to determine whether
lower federal courts will continue to construe the business necessity defense so
strictly. The trend indicates that some circuit courts are following the lead of the
Supreme Court and have reduced the employer's burden in a disparate impact case.
See EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 541 (6th Cir. 1981) (mere showing that
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After an employer has established that business necessity justifies a
discriminatory hiring criterion, the burden of proof shifts back to the
plaintiff. 40 At this point an employee is given an opportunity to prove
that despite the business necessity, an alternative selection procedure
exists which has a less discriminatory effect on a protected group.1
4 1
without the discriminatory criterion employees "would not function effectively" is
sufficient to establish business necessity); Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d
1267, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981) (test must merely be "predictive of . . . important ele-
ments of work behavior" to be justified by business necessity) (quoting Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719 (1982);
Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981)
("[I]ndispensibility is not the touchstone. Rather, the practice must substantially
promote the proficient operation of the business.").
140. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Chrisner v.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1260 (6th Cir. 1981). Prior to the
Albemarle decision, courts required the employer, not the plaintiff-job applicant, to
show that no suitable alternative hiring criterion was available. See Wallace v.
Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. St. Louis-S.F.
Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); B. Schlei
& P. Grossman, supra note 12, at 134-35; Search for Adequate Standards, supra note
121, at 415.
141. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Peques v. Missis-
sippi State Employment Serv., slip op. at 2980 (5th Cir. 1983); Contreras v. City of
Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1719
(1982); Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th Cir.
1981); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 611, 616 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 872 (1980); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980); Grove v. Frostburg Nat'l Bank, 549 F.
Supp. 922, 939 (D. Md. 1982); see Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674, 677 (8th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1974);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971). It has been argued that the plaintiff's burden is not to prove that a "less
discriminatory" alternative exists, but rather that a "nondiscriminatory" alternative
is available. See 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 79-30, at 15-153 to 15-
154. This interpretation is based on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975), in which the Court stated that once business necessity is established, the
challenged procedure will be preempted only if the plaintiff's proposed alternate
procedure does not present a "similar[ly] undesirable [discriminatory] effect." Id. at
425. The Larsons, while acknowledging the ambiguity of the Court's language, posit
that "any [discriminatory] effect is undesirable, and that an alternative plan with
any [discriminatory] effect is therefore 'similarly undesirable."' Under this theory,
plaintiff can meet his burden of proof, therefore, only by demonstrating that there
exists an alternative selection procedure that has no discriminatory effect. 3 A.
Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 79-30, at 15-154. This interpretation, however,
conflicts with the EEOC guideline requiring an employer to implement a selection
procedure that creates a "lesser adverse impact." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(B) (1982). The
Supreme Court has held that EEOC administrative guidelines are "entitled to great
deference" in determining the validity of a discriminatory selection criterion. Albe-
marle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971)); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94
(1973); cf. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 1932 n.12 (1982)
(deference to Department of Education guidelines).
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For if it is proven that there exists a less discriminatory manner in
which to select qualified employees, the practice can never be essen-
tial to the orderly operation of the business. 42 In such a case, the
disputed hiring criterion cannot be used.1 43
C. Justification of the Citizenship Criterion by Business Necessity
The Japanese have a compelling interest in continuing to hire and
promote citizens of Japan. An employee who is familiar with the
unusual Japanese management style would operate more efficiently
within a United States subsidiary than one who is accustomed to
Western methods.144 In addition, as discussed earlier in this Note, the
language difficulties that would be encountered145 and the unusual
decision-making procedures 46 used by the subsidiaries clearly would
hamper the efficient functioning of an American executive. As a
result, it would not be difficult for the subsidiary to prove that a
compelling and legitimate business purpose requires that nearly all
employees in managerial positions be citizens of Japan.147 The hiring
criterion, therefore, although discriminatory in impact, responds to a
business necessity.
Nonetheless, these practices will not survive scrutiny under Title
VII in light of the availability of less discriminatory alternatives. 48 If
hiring and promotional decisions within the United States-based sub-
sidiary were premised on an intimate understanding of the Japanese
business environment and language, instead of Japanese citizenship,
those American citizens who possess the required knowledge would
benefit. Even though these individuals would not be Japanese citizens,
they nonetheless would be given opportunities to advance within the
142. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 n.7 (4th Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
143. Connecticut v. Teal, 102 S. Ct. 2525, 2531 (1982); accord Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975).
144. See Y. Tsurumi, supra note 2, at 262; M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168. See
supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
147. It is significant to note that the business necessity argument that would be
offered by the Japanese does not involve a question of public safety. Thus, their
burden in proving the existence of a compelling reason for the continuation of the
practice is significantly increased. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645
F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981) ("where considerations of public safety are negligi-
ble, employment standards [must be] appropriately less demanding"). See supra note
130. Although most courts construe business necessity narrowly, not all consider
safety in their formulation of the defense. See supra note 131. If the hiring criterion
that is discriminatory in effect must be justified by "compelling need," Kirby v.
Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. International
Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1347 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), the
Japanese will have an easier time in defending their policy.
148. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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subsidiary. A job qualification based upon actual understanding of the
Japanese business community would serve the business purposes of the
subsidiary, 49 while not uniformly discriminating against those not of
Japanese national origin. This alternative hiring criterion would still
be somewhat discriminatory in effect, because those of Japanese na-
tional origin would be more likely to possess the required skills.' 50
However, such a criterion would have a less prejudicial effect than an
outright Japanese citizenship requirement. The existence of this less
discriminatory selection criterion would preclude the use of the busi-
ness necessity defense,' 51 and invalidate the Japanese employment
policies as they now stand.
CONCLUSION
The employment practices of Japanese subsidiaries present a case of
first impression in the employment discrimination field. While the
companies' employment practices deliberately favor citizens of Japan,
they may not constitute an intentional violation of Title VII because
citizenship requirements have not, in the past, been equated with
national origin discrimination. The Japanese practices, however,
present an instance in which citizenship and national origin should be
equated. If, as this Note advocates, a deliberate violation of Title VII
is found, the strict judicial interpretation of the BFOQ exception will
preclude a finding that the Japanese citizenship qualification is justi-
fied. The legislative history of Title VII, however, indicates that the
BFOQ exception should be applied more liberally in instances of
national origin discrimination.
Even if a court does not equate citizenship with national origin, the
practices of the Japanese are discriminatory in effect. Armed with the
Supreme Court's liberal view of the business necessity defense, the
Japanese multinationals may nonetheless be able to justify their cul-
turally based management practices. However, the existence of a less
discriminatory alternative selection procedure calls for the rejection of
these discriminatory hiring policies.
Stacey M. Rosner
149. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
150. For instance, there are very few Americans who are fluent in Japanese.
M. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 168.
151. The Japanese will not face this obstacle, however, if the alternative selection
procedure must be nondiscriminatory, not less discriminatory, as is suggested by two
commentators. 3 A. Larson & L. Larson, supra note 14, § 79.30. Requiring all
employees to have complete understanding of Japanese language and business prac-
tices would continue to discriminate in favor of those of Japanese national origin.
Therefore, under this interpretation, no nondiscriminatory alternative selection pro-
cedure would exist. The challenged hiring criteria, if justified by business necessity,
could be continued. There are, however, numerous problems with this interpretation
of the business necessity defense. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
